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App. B / Adult Businesses <br />major restrictions on sexually oriented businesses: distanc- <br />ing from specified uses, prevention of concentration and <br />amortization. It prohibited a sexually oriented business from <br />operating within 600 feet of districts zoned for residential or <br />office -residences, a church, state -licensed day care facility <br />and certain public -schools. It forbade an adults -only facility <br />from operating within 600 feet of any other adults -only <br />facility. Finally, the ordinance required existing sexually <br />oriented entertainment establishments to conform to its <br />provisions by moving to a new location, if necessary, within <br />four years. <br />The Eighth Circuit ruled that the Minneapolis ordinance <br />created restrictions too severe to be upheld under the Young <br />decision. It would have required all five of the city's sexually <br />oriented theaters and between seven and nine of the city's <br />ten sexually oriented bookstores to relocate and would have <br />required these facilities to compete with another 18 adult - <br />type establishments (saunas, massage parlors and "rap" <br />parlors) for a maximum of 12 relocation sites. The effective <br />result of enforcing the ordinance would be a substantial <br />reduction in the number of adult bookstores and theaters, <br />and no new adult bookstores or theaters would be able to <br />open, the Court concluded. Alexander, supra, 698 F.2d at 938. <br />In Renton, supra, the United States Supreme Court <br />adopted a clearer standard under which regulation of sexu- <br />ally oriented businesses could be tested and upheld. The <br />Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters <br />from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, sin- <br />gle- or multiple -family dwelling, church, park or school. <br />Justice Rehnquist, writing for a Court majority that in- <br />cluded Justices Stevens and Powell, stated that the Renton <br />ordinance did not ban adult theaters altogether and that, <br />therefore, it was "properly analyzed as a form of time, place <br />and manner regulation." Id. at 46, 106 S. Ct. at 928. When <br />time, place and manner regulations are "content -neutral" <br />and not enacted "for the purpose of restricting speech on the <br />41 - <br />Minnesota Attorney General's Report / App. B <br />basis of its content," they are "acceptable so long as they are <br />designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and <br />do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communi- <br />cation," Rehnquist stated. Id. He found the Renton ordinance <br />to be content -neutral because it was not aimed at the content <br />of films shown at adult theaters. Rather, the city's "predomi- <br />nant concerns" were with the secondary effects of the the- <br />aters. Id. at 47, 106 S. Ct. at 929 (emphasis in original). Once <br />a time, place or manner regulation is determined to be <br />content -neutral, "[tjhe appropriate inquiry ... is whether <br />the ... ordinance is designed to serve a substantial govern- <br />mental interest and allows for reasonable avenues of com- <br />munication," Rehnquist wrote for the Court. Id. at 60, 106 S. <br />Ct. at 930. <br />The Supreme Court found that Renton's "interest in pre- <br />serving the quality of urban life" is a `vital" governmental <br />interest. The substantiality of that interest was in no way <br />diminished by the fact that Renton "relied heavily" on stud- <br />ies of the secondary effects of adult entertainment estab- <br />lishments by Seattle and the experiences of other cities, <br />Rehnquist added. Id, at 61, 106 S. Ct. at 930-31. <br />The First Amendment does not require a city, before <br />enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or <br />produce evidence independent of that already generated <br />by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city <br />relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the <br />problem that the city addressee. That was the case here. <br />Nor is our holding affected by the fact that Seattle <br />ultimately chose a different method of adult theater <br />zoning than that chosen by Renton, since Seattle's <br />choice of a different remedy to combat the secondary <br />effects of adult theaters does not call into question either <br />Seattle's identification of those secondary effects or the <br />relevance of Seattle's experience to Renton. <br />Id. at 61-62, 106 S. Ct. at 931. <br />Rehnquist's inquiry then addressed the means chosen to <br />further Renton's substantial interest and inquired into <br />413 <br />CIA <br />0 <br />0 <br />cx <br />w <br />