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App. B / Adult Businesses <br />some suggestions are provided, based on evidence reviewed <br />by the Working Group, of types of zoning which can be <br />enacted to reduce the secondary effects of sexually oriented <br />businesses. <br />1. Documentation to Support Zoning Ordinances <br />Sexually oriented speech which is not obscene cannot be <br />restricted on the basis of its content without running afoul <br />of the First Amendment. The justification for regulating <br />sexually oriented businesses is based on proof that the zon- <br />ing is needed to reduce secondary effects of the businesses <br />on the community. <br />Since Renton, a number of adult entertainment zoning <br />ordinances have been invalidated for failure of the enacting <br />body to document the need for zoning regulations. Thus, one <br />court invalidated a zoning ordinance because there was "very <br />little, if any, evidence of the secondary effects of adult book- <br />stores ... before the City Council." 11126 Baltimore Boule- <br />vard, supra, 684 F. Supp. at 896; see also 7bllis Inc. v. San <br />Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987) <br />(ordinance construed to prohibit single showing of adult <br />movie in zoned area; invalidated for failure to present evi- <br />dence of secondary effects of single showing); but see Thames <br />Enterprises v. City of St. Louis, 861 F.2d 199,201-02 (8th Cir. <br />1988) (observations by legislator of secondary effects suffi- <br />cient). <br />On the other hand, it is not necessary for each municipal- <br />ity to conduct research independent of that already gener- <br />ated by other cities. The Renton court held that evidence of <br />the need for zoning of sexually oriented businesses can be <br />provided by studies from other cities "so long as whatever <br />evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be <br />relevant to the problem that the city addresses." Id. at 61, <br />106 S. Ct. at 931. See also SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 <br />F.2d 1268, 1274 (6th Cir. 1988) (public testimony from ex - <br />416 <br />Minnesota Attorney General's Report / App. B <br />perts, supporters and opponents and consideration of studies <br />by Detroit, Boston, Dallas and Los Angeles sufficient evi- <br />dence of legitimate purpose). <br />The first section of this report summarizes evidence from <br />various cities documenting the secondary effects of sexually <br />oriented businesses. Following Renton, it is intended that o <br />local communities will make use of this evidence in the <br />course of assembling support for reasonable regulation of <br />LIJ <br />sexually oriented businesses. <br />2. Availability of Locations for Sexually Oriented <br />Businesses <br />Courts also evaluate whether zoning of sexually oriented <br />businesses is merely a pretext for prohibition by reviewing <br />the alternative locations which remain for a sexually ori- <br />ented business to operate under the zoning scheme. A mu- <br />nicipality must "refrain from effectively denying ... a rea- <br />sonable opportunity to open and operate" a sexually oriented <br />business. Renton, supra, 476 U.S. at 64, 106 S. Ct. at 932. <br />Access may be regarded as unduly restricted if adult <br />entertainment zones are unreasonably small in area or if the <br />number of locations is unreasonably few. There is no set <br />amount of land or number of locations constitutionally re- <br />quired. The Renton court found that 620 acres of "accessible <br />real estate," including land "cries -crossed by freeways"— <br />more than five percent of the entire land area in Renton— <br />was sufficient. 476 U.S. at 63, 106 S.Ct. at 932. The Young <br />court found the availability of "myriad" locations sufficient. <br />427 U.S. at 72 n.36, 96 S.Ct. at 2463 n.36. <br />Whether .068 square miles constituting .23 of 1 percent of <br />the land area within the city's central business zone is <br />sufficient is not clear. See Alexander v. The City of Minnea- <br />polis (Alexander II), No. 3-88-808, slip op. at 22 (D. Minn. <br />May 22, 1989) (less than 1% of land area could be valid if <br />"ample actual opportunities" for relocation exist); Christy v. <br />417 <br />