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<br /> February, 1995 --formally limits both local-option taxes,at.4 percent and at .3 percent,and also
<br /> long-term debt at$800 million to fund the initial Phase I proposal to taxpayers, if approved then,
<br /> and at 16 percent of capital costs, for all follow-on Phase I proposals to voters, if successful at the
<br /> polls subsequently(at respectively pages 39 and 64). This combined tax-and-debt ceiling derives
<br /> from the so-called".4%/.4%bonding" schema,hastily developed by King,Pierce and Snohomish
<br /> County Executives in October, 1994, after Sound Transit agreed with those jurisdiction's senior
<br /> county legislators to limit that scheme's$1.3-to-$1.7 billion debt use to$800 million in return for
<br /> county legislatures allowing the agency's largest-of-three genuine "Study Option"alternatives--
<br /> for its$4.9 billion "pay as you go"transit-system plan for Phase I, as widely circulated among all
<br /> elected officials,and other community leaders,through printed booklets distributed in September,
<br /> 1994--to be thus-hugely transmogrified by its Board into a$6.704 billion project list, only a few
<br /> weeks later, in October, 1994(despite formal support of no debt"pay as you go"funding by local
<br /> elected officials, in northeast King County,through the Eastside Transportation Partnership, inter
<br /> alia). Sound Transit was forced to accept major tax-and-debt limits,via three resulting statutory
<br /> contracts,because the agency had to obtain formal legislative authorizations from at least two of
<br /> these three county councils to fulfill explicit statutory requirements to present any ballot measure
<br /> to regional taxpayers for its first Phase I proposal(i.e. to expend$6.704 billion,over 16 years or
<br /> less,which voters rejected on March 14, 1995),and for its much-smaller second Phase I proposal
<br /> (i.e. to spend$3.914 billion, in 10 years or less,which taxpayers accepted on November 5, 1996).
<br /> On April 18, 1995,in writing, Sound Transit explicitly reaffirmed all such tax-and-debt sources
<br /> of funding--as thus "legislatively authorized,"but also limited,by each county legislature--only
<br /> 40 days after regional taxpayers rejected the agency's initial and much-larger Phase I proposal,
<br /> in formal directions to the Puget Sound Regional Council to retain its thereby-more-limited use of
<br /> long-term debt than the agency's state-code authority to bond,due to local legislative restrictions,
<br /> via statutory contracts thus negotiated with these counties(but only if also authorized by voters as
<br /> to some Phase I proposal,eventually, during the brief period allowed by state law for balloting on
<br /> every Phase I plan). Thus,at 16 percent of total capital costs of$3.069 billion for all elements of
<br /> Sound Transit's much-revised and greatly-reduced Phase I reproposal,the Master Plan's limit for
<br /> long-term debt is $492 million(using Washington Research Council calculations of capital costs).
<br /> [c] "Ten-Year Regional Transit System Plan" at page B-6(apportioned to each type of debt).
<br /> [d] "Draft"Financial Statements for 2002(April 30,2003). *N.B. $55.6 million in "[o]ther
<br /> long-term liabilities" --identified by Deloitte&Touche without detail--may involve duplication.
<br /> [e] Exhibit 6 to King County/Sound Transit Contract for bus-tunnel usage(August,2002).
<br /> [f] Maximum short-term debt under Sound Transit's revised Phase I plan is calculated here by
<br /> subtracting maximum long-term debt lawful for every Phase I project,under the agency's "Master
<br /> Plan" and its statutory contracts, from the upper limit on total debt, long-and-short term,as Sound
<br /> Transit promised to regional taxpayers to obtain legal authority for taxation(in November, 1996).
<br /> [g] 1st Quarter 2003 Market Strategy Overview&Portfolio Performance(May 16,2003).
<br /> [h] Oral report presented by Hugh Simpson to Citizen Oversight Panel(June 5, 2003).
<br /> [i] Financial plan for 2003 (December,2002). Sound Transit's planned subarea-debt uses in
<br /> 2004 to 2006,at$158 million,are excluded because that ultra vires borrowing would more than
<br /> double the agency's already-exceeded lawful debt authority(from$140 million to$298 million).
<br /> [j] Oral report presented by Hugh Simpson to Citizen Oversight Panel(June 19, 2003).
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